Abstract
Introduction
On January 1, 2007, Romania became a member of the European Union. This achievement was in part made possible by a substantial reform effort that has allowed Romania to make impressive progress towards long-term stability and sustained growth in the last six years. Nonetheless, the income gap with the new member states of the EU remains large. In order to sustain growth and improve competitiveness, a second generation of reforms has been put in place to help the country's successful integration in EU and global
The PMR indicator system

Economic regulation
Administrative regulation 1.The numbers in brackets indicate the weight given to each lower level indicator in the calculation of the higher level indicator immediately above it.
The weights were derived by applying principal components analysis to the set of indicators in each of the main regulatory domains (state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to trade and investment, economic regulation and administrative regulation). The same approach was used to derive the weights used to calculate the indicators of inward and outward-oriented policies and the overall PMR indicator. The principal components analysis was based on the original 1998 data. Source: Conway et al. (2005) .
The structure of the PMR system is shown in Figure 1 . The system is composed of 16 basic or 'low-level' indicators, each capturing a specific aspect of the regulatory regime as described in Box 1. The basic indicators are progressively aggregated in more comprehensive policy areas. The highest level of aggregation corresponds to the summary measure of product market regulation in the country.
numerical value that allows ordering each of the possible responses to a given question. Quantitative information is ranked by subdividing it into categories based on a system of thresholds. The coded information is then normalized over a scale of zero to six. These data are then aggregated into basic or 'low-level' indicators by assigning subjective weights to the various regulatory requirements. Given the normalization of the basic data, all the low-level indicators also have a scale of zero to six, reflecting increasing restrictiveness of regulatory areas. 1 A detailed description of the low level indicators is presented in the Annex. Basic indicators are then aggregated into broader regulatory domains. Higher level indicators are calculated as weighted averages of their constituent lower level indicators. The attribution of lower-level indicators to each higher-level indicator, and the weights used in the aggregation, are based on principal component analysis (Nicoletti et al., 1999) . At the highest level of aggregation the overall indicator of product market regulation summarizes the restrictiveness of the regulatory framework in the product market. The structure of the PMR system, with progressive levels of aggregation, has the advantage of allowing a decomposition of higher-level indicators, with an increasing degree of detail, into the values of the more disaggregated indicators, each corresponding to specific regulatory provisions.
Choosing Benchmarks
The most obvious benchmarks for Romania are Bulgaria (for which data are available for 2006), and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are also OECD members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic collectively referred to as the OECD CEE). The fact that the data are from 2003, when the OECD CEE were at about the same point as Romania in 2006 relative to their accession to the EU, makes them even better benchmarks. Nevertheless, when interpreting comparative results, it should be kept in mind that comparators are likely to have made further progress since 2003. Additionally, comparison with Romania's 2002 PMR results provides an indication of the progress made in product market policies. However, since the 2002 PMR was estimated using an earlier methodology, the 2006 and 2002 scores for Romania are not strictly comparable. Nonetheless, both the order of magnitude and the relative standing of Romania clearly show an impressive drive towards adoption of product market policies that are less restrictive of competition in recent years.
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Extension of the benchmarking exercise to Brazil, Mexico and Turkey offers a broader perspective on other middle income countries (MICs) with different historical experiences. Finally, comparison with the OECD or high income EU15 countries helps identify longer-term objectives for policymakers.
These benchmarks are used in the graphs. Romania's score relative to the full set of countries (30 OECD members in 2003 , Brazil in 2004 and Bulgaria in 2006 is shown in Appendix I for all PMR indicators.
The Romanian Context
Until 2000, Romania was one of the poorest performing economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The turnaround in 2000 was preceded by a protracted and precipitous decline in GDP, a peaking of the poverty rate to 36 percent, and inflation of 54 percent per year. EU accession aspirations and the opening of official entry negotiations with the EU in December 1999 spurred Romania's commitment to reforms. This led to significant macroeconomic consolidation and impressive growth in recent years. As a result of the reforms, the economy has been growing at a robust 5 to 6 percent per year over the last six years. The main drivers for this growth have been investment and exports -and occasionally domestic consumption -that responded strongly to improved confidence in banks and macroeconomic stabilization. Inflation declined from above 40 percent in 2000 to 4.9 percent in 2006, the lowest level since the start of the transition. Fiscal consolidation, characterized by a cut in public expenditures of around 4% of GDP, allowed for a reduction in both inflationary pressures and the consolidated budget deficit. The latter shrank from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.7 percent in 2006. In addition, a combination of sustained growth and external migration permitted a substantial decrease in registered unemployment, down to around 5 percent of the labor force. The EU accession process also set the stage for a broad and sustained structural and institutional reform agenda. Privatization of commercial companies picked up, especially in banking and the energy sector, though it slowed down somewhat in 2006. Foreign direct investment (FDI) substantially increased after 2000, with inflows exceeding 5-6 percent of GDP per year recently. Institutional and governance reforms advanced, with the first generation measures, focused on the establishment of the legal framework and the redesign of the institutional architecture of the public sector, either adopted or in the process of being implemented. Important steps were also taken to upgrade the regulatory framework for businesses, remove administrative barriers and enhance the business climate. A major step forward was the adoption by the government, starting with 2001, of an annual Action Plan to remove administrative barriers to businesses.
1 The implementation of the Action Plan, updated annually, is overseen by a working group representing stakeholders, and its results are measured through surveys. This has led to the simplification of administrative and regulatory procedures and the decrease of the transaction costs for business entry and operation. As a result, Romania was ranked as the second most dynamic reformer in the world by the World Bank 2007 Doing Business report it terms of improving the legal and regulatory framework for business. These remarkable achievements notwithstanding, important aspects of the regulatory environment still need to be improved. This is true with regard to the quality of the rules and regulations, but more so with respect to their efficient enforcement. Business surveys suggest that sizeable regulatory obstacles to resource allocation remain, unnecessarily increasing the transaction costs for companies and hampering job creation. Some of these will be further documented in the paper. A central element of the regulatory reform agenda to be pursued by Romania is the continued implementation of less restrictive factor and product market policies and, even more so, the strengthening of the institutional framework for their effective implementation. This would encourage a more efficient allocation of resources and improve labor productivity. This is especially important given the significant gaps that Romania has in terms of incomes and productivity with EU members and the demographic trends laying ahead. Romania entered the EU with an estimated per capita income level of about 35% of the average for EU-15.
1 In addition, employment and participation rates, albeit improving recently, remain among the lowest in the EU. Evidence suggests that the reforms are paying off and that Romania is gradually, but constantly, catching up with the EU.
Benchmarking Production Market Policies in Romania
Enhancing competition in product markets has been found to positively affect GDP per capita by providing incentives to firms to reallocate resources to more productive activities, increase innovation and technological diffusion. In addition, less restrictive regulations may positively affect employment by reducing the rents that some firms extract from overregulation and force firms to expand their activities 2 . Benchmarking product market regulation has proved to be a useful tool for monitoring the performance of policies and institutions in OECD countries and for identifying specific policy gaps, thus offering the opportunity to benefit from the experience of other member states. Two surveys have been conducted so far collecting data for 1998 and 2003. Results from these surveys point to a convergence in product market policies across OECD countries, with substantial improvements achieved by countries that originally exhibited relatively restrictive product market regulations, such as Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, France, Mexico, Korea, Hungary, and Spain (Error! Reference source not found.) Substantial improvements in easing product market policies have been also achieved among EU15 countries where the average PMR score fell from 2.1 in 1998 to 1.4 in 2003. While this reflects the increasing harmonization of EU common market rules, the PMR benchmarking may have been instrumental in fostering this improvement. D e n m a r k I r e l a n d N e w Z e a l a n d C a n a d a S w e d e n L u x e m b o u r g J a p a n F in l a n d A u s t r ia B e l g iu m N e t h e r l a n d s S l o v a k R e p . G e r m a n y N o r w a y K o r e a P o r t u g a l S p a i n F r a n c e C z e c h R e p .
S w i t z e r l a n d G r e e c e I t a l y H u n g a r y M e x i c o T u r k e y P o l a n d E U Figure 2 and Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999) and OECD (2002a) Conway et al (2005) . (Conway, Janod, Nicoletti, 2005) . We now turn to an analysis of the various components of the PMR indicator, in order to examine in greater detail some of the drivers of this excellent performance, but also to identify remaining sources of restrictiveness of product market regulation. A useful approach in doing so is to decompose the indicator into inward and outward oriented policies. The former include policies and regulations that determine the degree of state control and barriers to entrepreneurship, while the latter reflect policies and regulations that affect barriers to trade and investment. Detailed description of the basic indicators included in the indicators of inward and outward oriented policies follows in the next sections. In general, average performance seems better in all countries for outward-than for inward-oriented policies ( Figure 5 ). This is certainly due to the requirements imposed by international agreements -such as the WTO charters, and, for EU countries, membership of the European Union -which are more binding in matters concerning trade and foreign direct investment. Greater reform challenges, as well as greater cross-country variation, lie with the regulations that fall under the category of inwardoriented policies. Within this general framework, Romania's product market regulations appear to be more restrictive of competition than the OECD and EU averages for outward oriented policies and around the OECD and EU averages for inward oriented policies. The fact that Romania positions itself around the EU average for inward oriented policies suggests that it has already met most of the requirements of the acquis communautaire. More generally, the great progress observed since 2002 in inwardoriented policies can be attributed to both the implementation of the acquis communautaire (e.g. competition policy), and to implementation of less restrictive policies in areas that are subject to domestic discretion. This indicates that the government has been diligent in complying with international commitments in domains that are often controversial from the standpoint of gathering sufficient domestic consensus.
As for outward-oriented policies, the data, hence the ranking and score, reflect policies in place as of the spring of 2006. A number of these have changed by the mere fact of Romania joining the EU and therefore becoming governed by EU trade policies and agreements. Inward and outward oriented policies and the underlying indicators are discussed in details below.
Inward-oriented Policies
In order to identify the drivers of Romania's progress since 2002, inward-oriented policies can be decomposed into two broad categories: indicators of state control and barriers to entrepreneurship ( Figure 6 ). 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship
Barriers to Competition
In terms of barriers to competition (as measured by licenses and permits requirements and antitrust exemptions) Romania's performance is comparable to both the rest of the EU and other MICs (Annex Table A1 .3). This is largely due to Romania's diligence in incorporating EU rules and practices in national legislation. This resulted in the elimination of antitrust exemptions for state-owned enterprises (Câmpeanu et al., 2003) . In this regard Romania fares very well and even better than EU15 and the average for the OECD countries ( Figure 7 ). On the other hand, Romania's performance in terms of other legal barriers to competition, in the form of explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed in certain business sectors, appears to have worsened relative to 2002. This could well be due to the change in methodologies. Whatever the reason, this appears to be one of the few categories in which Romania does not rank well. As in many other OECD and EU countries, this result appears to be driven by the existence of legal restrictions to entry in network and utilities sectors, such as rail, road and air transport infrastructure; electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply; and gas production, transmission, distribution and supply; and telecommunications (see Table A2 .10 for details). 
Regulatory and Administrative Opacity
Romania scores well in terms of regulatory and administrative opacity (Annex Table  A1 Romania has also implemented a number of reforms to improve the communication of rules and procedures to affected parties. The annual Action Plans to improve the business environment contain communication components whose aim is to enhance the interaction between the administration and the business community, some of which are discussed in Box 2.
Box 2. Romania's efforts at simplification and better communication of rules and regulations Measures adopted as part of the Plans include the development of a government site targeting communication with businesses (www.mdp-mediuafaceri.ro), which contains updated information relevant for companies, such as changes in legislation, explanation of implementation norms for laws, links to relevant ministries and government agencies, funding opportunities. Most of the important pieces of legislation impacting upon the business climate, such as the Silence-is-consent Law, the Decisional Transparency Law, the Free Access to Public Information Law, also benefited from broad media dissemination campaigns, including TV, radio and newspapers presentations, brochures and posters, direct free access telephone information lines to the government. Other traditional means of communication, such as meetings with relevant stakeholders, including businesses associations were broadly used, and company surveys were carried out, including by FIAS, to capture satisfaction with the changes and suggestions for further measures. To improve the interface between government and companies, an e-government site (www.eguvernare.ro) was established. The site allows businesses to access various forms and documents relevant for the interaction with the authority. A stakeholders group, which includes the most important business associations, oversees the implementation of the Action Plans Improvements in this domain are reflected in firm level surveys. For instance, BEEPS data suggest that the percentage of senior management time devoted to dealing with public officials in connection with regulation or access to public services has declined from over nine percent to less than two percent between 2002 and 2005. Nonetheless, despite these substantial efforts and achievements, the communication strategies of the authorities only partially succeeded to reach the mass of companies impacted upon. Many firms still complain about a gap between the provisions of the rules and their practical implementation, while others continue to find the access to relevant information difficult. Surveys suggest, for example, that many companies have not even heard about the Silent Approval law. Perhaps as a result the improvements in the rules and regulations were not reflected in perception-based indicators. Thus, Doing Business 2007 ranks Romania 116 th out of 172 countries in terms of dealing with licenses, even though Romania does well in the overall ease of doing businesses. A similar finding is reported by the BEEPS surveys that report that 40% of firms consider licenses to be a problem for doing business in the country. This is substantially worse than among comparator countries, and does not appear to have improved markedly since 2002 (Figure 9 ). 
Source: EBRD-WB BEEPS, 2005.
Surveys and discussions with companies suggest that, while a limited number of firms seem to be severely affected; most of the difficulties arise for those requesting production and construction licenses. The procedures for obtaining a construction authorization and the certificate for urbanism seem to be long. The procedures to subsequently connect buildings to utilities, mainly gas and electricity, are also long and relatively costly. This paper recommends continuing the simplification of these procedures, as this is critical to the smooth implementation of projects financed from the EU structural and cohesion funds, especially in infrastructure and environment.
Administrative Burdens on Start-Ups
Romania's policies in terms of facilitating the creation of new firms remain liberal relative to 2002, since administrative burdens are lower than among comparators for startups in general, and in specific service sectors, such as road transport and retail distribution (Figure 10 ). The indicator of administrative burdens for corporation measures the number of procedures, number of days, and the minimum capital required to start a limited liability company. The burden on business creation is substantially lower than in other countries even the EU15 and the OECD. The number and duration of procedures, as well as the cost involved in starting a company is lower in Romania than in other middle income countries and on a par with the best practice of top performers in the EU, such as Ireland or the UK. This could, however, be partly driven by the fact that slightly different data and methods were used to calculate this indicator for Romania. A homogenization procedure was therefore necessary to make its score comparable to the other countries (see Table A2 .8 for details). However, this excellent ranking is consistent with Doing Business' data that rank Romania as the 7 th best country (out of 175) in terms of ease of starting a business (it was the 6 th in 2005).
Romania's rankings and good performance vis-à-vis the ease of starting a business reflect the continued simplification and reduction (down to five) of the company registration procedures, especially after 2004. These took central stage in three consecutive Action Plans (2004, 2005, and 2006 ) for the reduction of administrative barriers to entry and operation of businesses, and were part of the PSAL/PAL programs. The establishment of one-stop shops for firm registration played an important role in this progress. The measures implemented through the Action Plans followed the recommendations of two World Bank/FIAS reports (2002 and 2004) .
State Control of the Economic Activity
Despite the decline in state control since 2002 (a trend that started in 1999), Romania's performance still lags behind that of the OECD average and the EU 15. The gradual reduction of the state's presence in the economy was a crucial element of the reform package associated with Romania's EU pre-accession commitments. As a result, between 1999 and 2006, most of the commercial companies held in the portfolio of the privatization agency AVAS and in the banking sector were privatized. The energy sector was unbundled and important privatizations took place in electricity and gas distribution. The national oil company was also privatized, although the government retains a golden share in Petrom. In parallel, price liberalization in many sectors and the adjustment of energy tariffs reduced direct state involvement in services and improved the efficiency of resources allocation. Nevertheless, public enterprises still represent a substantial part of the economy and important energy generation companies, whose governance requires further improvement, continue to be managed by the state. Some energy tariffs have not yet reached import price parity. 
Public Ownership
The aggregate indicator for public ownership covers size and scope of public enterprise sector, as well as direct control over business enterprises. Given that there is much more variation among EU15 or OECD countries for these indicators, we show the full set of comparators (Figure 12 ). We find that while the scope of the public sector is below the OECD average, both the degree of control exercised by the state over public enterprises and the size of the public enterprise sector are above the OECD average.
The indicator for size is the largest in the sample, suggesting that the public sector remains significant in Romania. This may, however, be an artifact of the methodology: the approach follows a perpetual inventory method whereby an initial estimate of the public enterprise sector is reduced by an amount equivalent to the value of privatization receipts, as captured in the general government budget. This approach may be creating an upward bias in the computation of the "size" indicator for Romania. This is because a large segment of the Romanian economy was privatized through mass privatization (vouchers scheme) whereby the state did not receive any privatization proceeds. A large number of enterprises were acquired by domestic investors and, oftentimes, the price component of the deal was not the most important. Rather the divestiture of the large public industrial sector, with the quality of its assets often questionable, took primacy in the privatization process. Sometimes the privatized companies were allowed, as part of the privatization contract, to retain part of the privatization proceeds for restructuring and upgrades. In addition, several large privatizations deals, done with strategic investors, came to closure after the period of analysis covered in the present paper. Nevertheless, other sources confirm that the Romanian public enterprise sector remains important. Its size was estimated at around 30% of GDP in 2005 by the Romanian National Institute for Statistics (this has decreased in 2006, as several important privatization deals, especially in banking and energy, went through, such as that of the largest bank, BCR). As to its scope, it is also relatively wide given that the state holds important equity stakes in the largest firms in several sectors, such as electricity, gas, oil, banking (CEC bank), rail and road infrastructure and municipal utilities. Nonetheless, when looking at the scope of the public sector, which captures the extent to which the state holds equity stakes in the largest firm in different sectors, Romania is close to the OECD average and in a better position than several EU15 countries (Figure 12b ). Romania's standing worsens when public ownership is further examined from the point of view of the pervasiveness of the formal control exerted by public bodies on public enterprises (Figure 12c ). This result is driven by the presence of a golden share retained by the government in the oil sector. The golden share implies that important decisions can be taken only with a share of 75% of the board votes. The fact that the government controls more than 25% of the votes gives it the power to interfere with decisions concerning mergers or acquisitions, changes in the controlling coalition, acquisition of equity by foreign investors, choice of management or other strategic management decisions. 
Involvement in Business Operation
Regarding state intervention in the overall economy, the use of price controls has substantially decreased since the first phase of transition (World Bank 2004) . (The variable measures the existence of price regulation or administrative control of prices in air travel, road freight, telecommunications, and retail distribution sectors). However, prices for some utilities remain administered, especially in the energy sector, where tariffs are below import parity, despite significant adjustments taking place in recent years. Tariffs are also below cost recovery in the case of the least efficient electricity and heating generators. As to the use of command and control regulation, it remains significant, albeit to a lesser degree than the EU15 average and on par with the OECD average (  Figure 13 ). Overall, it is in line with comparator groups, although Romania's performance is still far from that of the best practice countries (Australia, New Zealand, Slovakia to cite a few). The indicator reflects the extent to which government uses coercive (as opposed to incentive-based) regulation, in general and in specific service sectors (Box 3). Romania's relatively good comparative score is driven by the fact that authorities have pursued a regulatory reform agenda driven by the highest OECD standards of regulatory quality, for instance by enshrining in legislation best OECD practices such as the considerations of alternatives to regulation as part of the process of adoption of new legislation. Nonetheless, weak implementation may defeat the purpose of the rules themselves. The contrasting use of "command-and-control" and "incentive-based" regulation appear to have been brought into common usage by Schultze who wrote in a 1977 lecture about economic efficiency: "We tend to see only one way of intervening -namely removing a set of decision from the decentralized and incentive-oriented private market and transferring them to the command-and-control techniques of government bureaucracy" (page 6) In this context, the PMR attempts to measure the extent to which the cost of new regulation is assessed, and whether alternatives are considered before implementing new regulations. About half of the indicator weights are allocated to the following two questions (the full makeup of the indicator is provided in Annex table A2.5):
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy instruments (regulatory and nonregulatory) before adopting new regulation. (Current answer: yes). Explanation. The use of a wide range of mechanisms for meeting policy goals, not just traditional regulatory controls, helps to ensure that the most efficient and effective approaches are used. Approaches may include green taxes and subsidies, voluntary agreements, information programs such as eco labeling, self-regulation, permit-trading schemes, and performance-based regulation (where a sector or industry must comply with a standard but can broadly choose how to meet it). Note that the question only refers to whether the obligation exists as a specific provision in a specific legislative act, not whether the spirit of it is in fact respected. A positive answer to the question would require the existence of a normative act explicitly ruling out regulation as the default option Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to traditional regulation. (Current answer: no). Explanation. The regulatory process is governed by a standard procedure, outlining the steps to be taken to issue new regulation. For instance, the procedure may include binding ex ante regulatory impact assessment (RIA). Box 3 offers a discussion of alternatives to traditional regulation.
Annex I
Comparisons with Full Sample (Conway et al. 2005) . 
